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ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-REGULATION OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT-BEHAVIOR OF ATTORNEY WHO SOLICITS CLIENT FOR
PECUNIARY GAIN Is NOT SANCTIONED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT
WHEN ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES ARE LIKELY
Appellant, an attorney, was disciplined by the Ohio Supreme
Court for recommending his own legal services to two young
women eleven days after they were injured in an automobile ac-
cident. 1 Appellant solicited one of the women while she was in the
hospital, and the other the day she was released from the hospital. 2
Appellant and one of the women were at most casual acquain-
tances. 3 Appellant initiated the meetings with both women, and
both retained him. 4 Later both women discharged appellant as
their attorney. Appellant insisted he had a binding agreement and
brought suit against one of the women for services rendered. 6 Both
women filed grievances with the Ohio State Bar Association which
charged appellant with violating the anti-solicitation ban under the
1. Ohralik v. Ohio State BarAss'n., -. U.S .. .. 98 S. Ct. 1912, 1924(1978).
2. Id. at _ - 98 S. Ct. at 1915-16. Appellant visited one of the women in the hospital
where he found her lying in traction. After a brief conversation, appellant told her he would
represent her and asked that she sign a contingent fee agreement. The woman refused to sign until
she talked to her parents. Appellant then sought out the other accident victim. Id. at __, 98 S. Ct.
at 1915. Upon learning that she had been discharged from the hospital earlier in the day, appellant
then visited the accident scene, took photographs, picked up a tape recorder, which he concealed un-
der his raincoat, and proceeded to the home of the accident victim's parents. Id. at -, 98 SCt. at
1915-16. Once there, he examined their automobile insurance policy and explained that the driver
of the other vehicle was an uninsured motorist, but that their policy would provide up to $12,500 for
each girl under an uninsured motorist clause. Id. at __, 98 S. Ct. at 1916. The accident victim then
phoned her parents and told the appellant to "go ahead" with her representation. Id.
3. Id. at__, 98 S. Ct. at 1915.
4. Id. at -, 98 S. Ct. at 1915. Eventually one of the women did sign the contingent fee
agreement: the other acquiesced with an "O.K." Id. at -, 98 S. Ct. at 1916.
These two young women were driver and passenger in a car involved in an accident. Id. at
__, 98 S. Ct. at 1915. None of the charges against Ohralik by the Ohio disciplinary authorities,
however, arose out of the possibly conflicting representation of the two women. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n. v. Ohralik. 48 Ohio St.2d 217, 357 N.E.2d 1097 (1976). See, e.g., Jedwabnv v. Philadelphia
Transportation Co., 390 Pa. 231, 135 A.2d 252 (1957) cert. denied, 355 U.S. 966 (1'958) (conflicts of
interest between driver and passengers were such that the same attorney could not fairly represent
both parties' interests-decided under old Canon 6, which did not go as far in prohibiting represen-
tation of conflicting interests as does its descendent. Canon 5 of the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITN as specified particularly at EC5-15 in the Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary
Rules promulgated in aid of the canon). See generallyi ABA CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
EC5-14, EC5-15. DR5-105 (A). (B).
5. Id. at _. 98 S. Ct. 1916. The mother of one of the accident victims attempted to repudiate
her daughter's oral agreement, but appellant insisted that the daughter had entered into a binding
contract. Id.
6. Id. at _, 98S. Ct. 1916-17.
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Code of Professional Responsibility.7  Although the bar
association's grievance committee recommended a public
reprimand, the Ohio Supreme Court increased the discipline to in-
definite suspension.8 The United States Supreme Court held that
the Bar may discipline a lawyer for in-person solicitation for finan-
cial gain, when the circumstances of the solicitation are likely to
produce adverse consequences. 9 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,
__U.S. __ , 98 S. Ct. 1912 (1978).
Proscriptions against attorney solicitation, advertising and
self-laudation first surfaced in the United States in 190810 when the
American Bar Association (ABA) adopted Canon 27.11 Both direct
and indirect advertising, such as newspaper comments and
publicity photos, were thought to "lower the tone" of the legal
profession and were "reprehensible."1 2 Since 1908 all states that
have codified the lawyer disciplinary rules have also adopted the at-
titude and essence of the ABA's restrictions on lawyer ad-
vertising. 13
The anti-advertising, anti-solicitation, anti-publicity
provisions of 1908, however, have been subject to attack by those
who wish to replace the negativism with a more positive goal of
7. OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIIf DR 2-103(A), DR 2-104(A). DR 2-103(A)
provides as follows: "A lawyer shall not recommend employment, as a private practitioner, of him-
self, his partner, or associate to a non-lawyer who has not sought his advice regarding employment of
a lawyer." DR 2-104(A) provides as follows: "A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to a
layman that he should obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept employment resulting from
that advice, except that: . .. [exceptions not applicable here]" These DRs also appear in the ABA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.
8. Ohio State Bar Ass'n. v. Ohralik, 48 Ohio St. 2d 217, 357 N.E.2d 1097 (1976). Appellant's
defense was that his conduct was entitled to first and fourteenth amendment protections. The
disciplinary board found, however, that appellant had violated the anti-solicitation ban and rejected
the appellant's claim to first and fourteenth amendment protections. The Supreme Court noted
probable jurisdiction to consider the scope of first amendment protection afforded to this form of
commercial speech as well as to consider the state's authority to regulate and discipline licensed bar
members. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
9. __ U. S. at -, 9 ,S. Ct. at 1915.
10. Note, Advertising, So'licitation and the Profession's Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE
LJ. 1181, 1182 (1972). Prior to 1908 no general prohibition of lawyer advertising or solicitation
existed in the United States. Id. at 1182.
11. Shadur, Publicity, Advertising, and Solicitation, in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY-A GUIDE FOR
ATTORNEYS 45 (D. Ream. ed. 1978). Cannon 27 declared it to be "unprofessional to solicit
professional employment by circulars, advertisements, through touters or by professional com-
munications or interviews not warranted by personal relations." The original 32 Cannons of
Professional Ethics were adopted by the ABA in 1908. The new Code of Professional Responsibility
was adopted in 1969 and contains nine Canons which are followed by Ethical Considerations and
Disciplinary Rules. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preface at i (1977).
12. Shadur, supra, note 11.
13. IdJustifications for banning lawyer publicity and solicitation have, in general, focused on
the following harms: first, that advertising will stir up ideal litigation and fraudulent claims; second,
that potential clients will be harmed by over-reaching attorneys through overcharging or under-
representing; and, third, that advertising and solicitation detracts from the dignity of the legal
profession. Id. at 46-47. A fourth justification for banning lawyer solicitation, corruption of public of-
ficials, is based on the presumption that the soliciting lawyer will pay doctors or hospital personnel
and policemen for information concerning prospective clients. Note, A Critical Analysis of Rules Against
Solicitation by Lawyers, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 674,680 (1958). See also Note supra note 10.
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maximizing the availability of legal counsel to the public.' 4 This
specific trend is apparent in related situations concerning ad-
vertising of professional services.' 5 Recent commercial speech
decisions demonstrate a broadening of first amendment protection
of speech formerly considered excluded from protection. 16 Most
recently Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council'7
stated that truthful commercial speech is afforded limited protec-
tion.' 8 The Supreme Court noted that the free flow of information
is vital to the free enterprise system. ' 9 While recognizing that com-
mercial advertisements may be of interest and importance to the
public,20 however, the Court hedged the protection to be afforded
commercial speech with several qualifications. 21
Virginia Pharmacy Board left open the question of whether a
lawyer may advertise.2 2 Consequently in Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona,2 3 the Supreme Court was called upon to determine the
constitutional validity of an Arizona Supreme Court rule which
prohibited lawyers from advertising the availability and price of
legal services. The Court concluded that the justifications24 ad-
14. Shadur, supra note 11, at 48. The Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules concerned
with advertising, solicitation and publicity were placed under Canon 2 which states as follows: "A
Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession in Fulfilling Its Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available."
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 2 (1977). See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n.
- U.S. ., 98 S. Ct. 1925, 1926 (1978) (Marshall, J., separate opinion, concurring in part
and concurring in the judgments). See also Brickman, OfArterial Passageways Through the Legal Process:
The Right of Universal Access to Courts and Lawyering Services, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 595 (1973).
15. See Virginia State Bd. V. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748 (1976);
Bigelowv. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809 (1975).
16. Virginia State Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). "[T]he
free flow of commercial information is indispensible." Id. at 765. The Suloreme Court agreed that
the channels of communication should be opened rather than closed. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,
433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977). See also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (first amendment protec-
tions extended to newspaper advertisement of abortion services).
17. 425 U.S. 748(1976).
18. Id. at 748. "What is at issue is whether a State may completely suppress the dissemination of
concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information's effect
upon its disseminators and its recipients. . . . [W]e conclude that the answer to this one is in the
negative." Id. at 773. The Court further noted that commercial speech, like other forms of speech,
may be subject to regulation based on time, place and manner restrictions. Nor has untruthful
speech been granted protection. "The [first [almendment . . . does not prohibit the State from in-
suring that the stream of commercial information flow clearly as well as freely." Id. at 770-72.
19. Id. at 765.
20. Id. at 764-65. The Court noted that a "commercial" advertisment may be of general in-
terest to the public. Intelligent decisions on the aggregate are informed decisions. As such the free
flow of information is imperative. Id.
21. See supra note 18.
22. 425 U.S. at 773. Physicians and lawyers "do not dispense standardized products; they ren-
der professional services of almost infinite variety and nature, with the consequent enhanced
possibility for confusion and deception if they were to undertake certain kinds of advertising." Id.
(emphasis original).
23. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). The controversy was generated by a legal clinic's newspaper block ad-
vertisement listing prices for routine legal matters. Id. at 354. The advertisement, placed by the ap-
pellants, stated that they offered legal services at very reasonable prices and listed their fees for un-
contested divorces, uncontested adoptions, simple personal bankruptcies, and changes of name. Id.
at 385.
24. Id. at 368-79. The justifications included the following: the adverse effect on
professionalism, the inherently misleading nature of attorney advertising, the adverse effect on the
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vanced for a complete ban on lawyer advertising by the state were
insufficient to deny first amendment protection to truthful com-
mercial advertising in newspapers. 2 5
While solicitation pertains to a lawyer's face-to-face contact
with a layman for the purpose of gaining a client, advertising refers
to a lawyer's arms-length attempts to communicate to the general
public information about his practice.2 6 The Supreme Court
acknowledged that in-person solicitation may prove problematic in
differentiating between deceptive and non-deceptive advertising. 27
It stated that solicitation might pose such dangers as overreaching
and misrepresentation. 28 Bates maintained that the first amendment
allows the legal profession to advertise; leaving open the question of
attorney solicitation. 29 Therefore, the power that the states have to
place a broad proscription against attorney in-person solicitation
for precuniary gain remained intact. 30
In Ohralik the Supreme Court acknowledged that lawyer in-
person solicitation for pecuniary gain is inconsistent with the
profession's ideal of the attorney client relationship. 31 Solicitation
motivated by monetary gain poses significant harms of
overreaching, and undue influence to the prospective client. 32
Solicitation may cause the potential client to make an immediate
response, 33 whereas advertising allows the recipient to reflect on the
message and make a reasoned response. 34 Further, there is little or
no opportunity to oversee or regulate the in-person solicitation,
administration of justice, the undesirable economic effects of advertising, the adverse effect of ad-
vertising on the quality of service, and the difficulties of enforcement. Id.
25. Id. at 383. See also Friedman v. Rogers, -U.S.__ , 98S. Ct. 887(1979).
26. Note, supra note 1U, 81 YALE L.J. at 1181 n.4.
27. 433 U.S. at 366. The Court explicitly stated it was not resolving the problems associated
with attorney in-person solicitation of clients. Id.
28. Id. at 366. The Court also suggested that attorney solicitation of a client in a hospital room
or accident site breeds undue influence. Id.
29. Id. at 350.
30. See In re Ades, 6 F. Supp. 467 (D. Md. 1934); Remington v. State Bar ofCal., 218 Cal. 446,
23 P.2d 510 (1933); In re Cohn, 10 Ill. 2d 186, 139 N.E.2d 301 (1957); People v. Berezhiak, 292 Ill.
305, 125 N.E. 36(1923).
Personal solicitation sometimes called ambulance chasing has an interesting history. Am-
bulance chasing in the United States had its beginnings back in 1907 when an enterprising lad of 18,
Abraham Gatner, persuaded a law firm to hire him to secure potential clients. Although no am-
bulances were actually chased, names of accident victims were acquired through devious means;
Gatner took to hanging around police headquarters paying reporters for accident tips and eventually
promised hundreds of policemen a three dollar tip for every accident lead. As Gatner's ambitions
grew so did the competition; yet "Gatner remained one step ahead." At the newly formed New York
Police Academy, he told policemen in training of their opportunities "to flesh out their pay" by
keeping Gatner's phone number with them at all times. His business prospered until 1928 when he
was found guilty of defrauding a lawyer associate and sentenced to a brief jail term. ("No doubt the
fact that he had been a willing witness for the investigation mitigated his sentence considerably."!)
M. BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS 126-30 (1968).
31. __ U.S. at __, 98 S. Ct. at 1917.
32. Id. at __, 98S. Ct. at 1920-22.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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whereas media advertising more easily provides for reflective ac-
tivity by the client as well as regulated action by the state. 35
The Ohralik Court further noted that commercial speech is af-
forded limited first amendment protection. 36 There exists a com-
mon sense distinction between speech involving a commercial
transaction, which is traditionally subject to government
regulation, 3 7 and other forms of speech. 38 Although solicitation
involves speech, the state is not powerless to regulate a potentially
harmful commercial activity whenever speech is a component of
that activity. 39 Commercial speech, then, is not considered to be
beyond the state's regulatory powers. 40 Since financial gain was an
element of the solicitation in Ohralik, the level of judicial scrutiny
used by the Court was less demanding than if the speech were
without the commercial element. 41
The speech' activity did not actually have to impinge upon a
right of the client in order to be subject to state regulation. 42 The
Court concluded that the state may take preventive measures in or-
der to regulate solicitation for monetary gain. 43 The Ohralik Court
pointed out that there need not be any subsequent finding of fraud,
deception, coercion or duress before the speech activity is subject to
state regulation. 44 In addition, a subsequent actual finding of harm
to the client need not be demonstrated. 45
North Dakota lawyers are presently subject to this same at-
torney solicitation proscription for monetary gain. 46 Although there
have been no cases concerning attorney in-person solicitation for
financial gain in North Dakota it follows, from North Dakota's
adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility,4 7 and in light
of Ohralik that North Dakota's prohibition of in-person attorney
solicitation for precuniary gain does not violate the first amend-
35. Id. at__, 98 S. Ct. at 1924.
36. Id. at _. 98 S. Ct. at 1918. The Court reiterated the Bates holding that truthful
advertising by lawyers is protected against blanket prohibition. Id. at 1915.
37. Hinchev. The First Amendment and the Delivery of Legal Services, 63 A.B.A.J. 945 (1977). Only
the exchange of ideas was thought to fall within the protection of the first amendment. Id.
38. __ U.S. at.___, 98 S. Ct. at 1918.
39. Id. at -. , 98 S. Ct. at 1919.
40. Id. Nor was commercial speech beyond the state's regulatory powers in Virzinia State Bd.
or Bates. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at _. 98 S. Ct. at 1923. "The rules prohibiting solicitation are prophylactic measures
whose objective is the prevention of harm before it occurs." Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. "The rules were applied in this case to discipline a lawyer for soliciting employment for
pecuniary gain under circumstances likely to result in the adverse conequences the State seeks to
avert.'" Id.
45. Id.
46. N.D. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(A) and DR 2-104(A) are identical to
the OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. See supra note 7.
47. Matter of Howe. 257 N.W.2d 420. 422 (N.D. 1977). Canon 2 is presently being revised.
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ment rights of lawyers practicing in this state.4 8 It is equally clear,
however, that North Dakota's blanket proscription against attorney
solicitation in all of its diverse forms may not withstand first amen-
dment challenge. 49
The broadly stated, flatly proscriptive anti-advertising and an-
ti-solicitation provisions of an earlier era have been relegated to the'
dated textbooks. At the present time, however, the ban prohibiting
in-person attorney solicitation for pecuniary gain remains intact.
DIANE MELBYE
Telephone interview with Joel Gilbertson, Executive Director, State Bar Ass'n. of North Dakota
(Jan. 26, 1979).
48. SeeSupra note 46. The Supreme Court of North Dakota has not taken any official position on
attorney advertising or solicitation. Whether North Dakota attorneys should be permitted to ad-
vertise on radio or television has been subject to considerable debate as well. The State Bar recom-
mended that media advertising be allowed. See The Gavel at I (N.D. State BarAss'n.June 1978); The
Gavel at 1 (N.D. State Bar Ass'n. Dec. 1977); The Gavel at I (N.D. State Bar Ass'n. Oct. 1977); The
Gavel at 1 (N.D. State Bar Ass'n. Sept. 1977). The North Dakota Supreme Court, however, has not
acted on the proposal. Telephone interview with Marshall Bergerud, Chairman of the North Dakota
Ethics Committee. State Bar Ass'n. of North Dakota (Jan. 30, 1979).
49. In re Primus. _U.S.__ , 98 S. Ct. 1893 (1978). The Court concluded that in areas of
_, 98S. Ct. at 1908. See also NAACP v. Button. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). Is should be noted,
however, that pursuant to the action of the membership of the State Bar Association. taken at its
July. 1978 annual meeting, the Ethics Committee has revised the pertinent pro\ isions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for presentation to the Board of Covernors as of this writing.
